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A popular Government, without popular information, or the means of acquir- 
ing it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps both.1 
	  
Many may wonder who is at the center of decisions to kill U.S. citizens and 
foreign nationals in drone strikes in the war on terror. A legal clinic2 affiliated 
with CUNY School of Law recently submitted a Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”) request to the National Security Council (“NSC”) seeking this pre- 
cise information.3 In a startling example of national secrecy and evasion of 
accountability, the government asserted that “records”4 of “U.S. officials debat- 
ing whether to kill people, including U.S. citizens, outside of recognized battle- 
fields and without judicial process, are categorically immune from the 
[FOIA].”5 The government argued further that the President of the United 
States has the unrestricted authority to destroy any such records.6 In denying 
the clinic’s request, District Court Judge Vitaliano relied specifically on the 
1996 D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals case, Armstrong v. Executive Office of the 
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1 Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822). 
2 Main Street Legal Services, Inc. is a non-profit law firm within the City University of 
New York School of Law, located at 2 Court Square in Queens, New York. Complaint for 
Injunctive Relief at 1, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 
2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013). 
3 Id. at 2. Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request to Defendant dated November 27, 2012 
that requested . . . all records related to the killing of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals by 
drone strike . . . all NSC meeting minutes taken in the year 2011. In a letter dated December 
14, 2012, but postmarked January 18, 2013, Defendant responded to Plaintiff’s FOIA re- 
quest by simply asserting that the NSC was not subject to the FOIA and withheld the re- 
quested records. Id. at 2-3. 
4 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)(A) (2012) (defining “record” as “any information that would be 
an agency record subject to the requirements of this section when maintained by an agency 
in any format, including an electronic format”). 
5 Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Forum: The NSC, Drone Killing Accountability and 
New FOIA Litigation, JURIST (Aug. 2, 2013), http://jurist.org/forum/2013/08/cox-kassem- 
NSC-accountability.php####. 
6 Id.; see also Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure 
to State a Claim at 4, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 








President.7 Armstrong barred citizen access to documents generated by the 
NSC on the ground that the NSC is not an agency subject to the FOIA.8 In 
1997, the Supreme Court denied Armstrong’s petition for certiorari,9 in what 
appeared to be the end of this debate until now. Armstrong is finally being 
challenged outside the D.C. Circuit after two decades of wars involving an in- 
stitutionalized use of unmanned drones 10 and a radical transformation in U.S. 
national security policy.11 
Under the rationale of Armstrong, substantial numbers of potentially signifi- 
cant documents surrounding the activities of the NSC may never be exposed.12 
This is particularly troubling because the NSC is likely to expand its use of 
unmanned drones for extrajudicial killings.13 Moreover, by some estimates, the 
number of militants and civilians killed in the on-going drone campaign over 
the past decade will soon surpass 3,000, exceeding the number of people killed 
by al-Qaeda in the September 11 terrorist attacks.14 Currently, the government 
categorizes NSC records pursuant to the Presidential Records Act (“PRA”).15 
This classification undercuts the public’s capability to evaluate and hold re- 




7 Main St. Legal Servs. v. Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712, at 
*3–7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2013). As the District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
observed, “Current events have changed little, except perhaps to heighten the American 
government’s concern over (and awareness of) threats to national security interests.” Id. at 
*3. Concluding, the district court said, “The Court finds no reason to depart from Arm- 
strong’s thoroughly persuasive and well-articulated reasoning.” Id. at *7. 
8 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
9 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. 
denied, 520 U.S. 1239 (1997). 
10 See generally Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, Main St. Legal Servs., Inc. v. 
Nat’l Sec. Council, No. 13-CV-00948, 2013 WL 4494712 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2013). 
11 Melvyn P. Leffler, 9/11 and the Past and Future of American Foreign Policy, 79 No. 
5 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1045, 1046 (2003). 
12 R. Kevin  Bailey,  Note,  “Did I Miss Anything?”: Excising the National Security 
Council from FOIA Coverage, 46 DUKE L.J. 1475, 1478 (1997). 
13 Lesley Clark & Jonathan S. Landay, Obama Speech Suggests Possible Expansion of 
Drone  Killings,  MCCLATCHYDC  (May  23, 2013), 
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/05/23/192081/obama-promises-anew-to-transfer.html; 
see also Greg Miller, Plan for Hunting Terrorists Signals U.S. Intends to Keep Adding 




14 Miller, supra note 13. 
15 Douglas Cox & Ramzi Kassem, Off the Record: The National Security Council, 
Drone Killings & Historical Accountability, 31 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2014), avail- 
able                                                                                                                                           at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283243http://ssrn.com/abstract=2283243http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2283243. 




U.S. citizens and citizens of other nations with unmanned drones.16 It hinders 
government officials in determining whether to continue the program and also 
hinders congressional decision-making.17 Further, it permits surreptitious 
members of an administration to shift functions from an agency subject to 
FOIA to the NSC, precluding transparency.18 Armstrong is inconsistent with 
the fundamental purpose of the FOIA—“to ensure that the Government re- 
mains open and accessible to the American people and is always based not 
upon the ‘need to know’ but upon the fundamental ‘right to know.’”19 As 
President Obama stated, “The Freedom of Information Act should be adminis- 
tered with a clear presumption: In the face of doubt, openness prevails.”20 This 
inclination towards disclosure should be applied to all decisions of the U.S. 
government, including the decisions of the NSC.21 
Despite the result in the district court, Main Street Legal Services is appeal- 
ing to the Second Circuit.22 Considering the explosive expansion of NSC’s 
mandate to conduct activities independent of the President,23 the Second Cir- 
cuit should overrule Armstrong as outdated. If the Second Circuit disagrees 
with the Armstrong ruling, then there will be a conflict in the circuits on a 
pressing social issue, affecting all, which should necessitate intervention by the 
Supreme Court.24 
This Comment discusses the need for courts to revisit and overrule Arm- 
strong; its analysis is outdated and should be reexamined in light of the ever- 
widening activities of the NSC. The Comment begins by discussing the rele- 
vant information access laws and their impact on federal government entities’ 
status as agencies; Part II provides a historical overview of the NSC; Part III 
explains the lengthy and complex legal controversy over the preservation and 
disclosure of NSC records leading up to the decision in Armstrong; Part IV 





18 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1489. 
19 Openness Promotes Effectiveness in Our National Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. 
No. 110-175, § 2, 121 Stat. 2524, 2525 (2007); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). 
20 Memorandum from President Barack Obama for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009). 
21 Id. 
22 Dasol Jung, CUNY Law Firm Seeks Drone Records, TICKER (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://ticker.baruchconnect.com/article/cuny-law-firm-seeks-drone-records/; see also Josh 
Gerstein, Judge Rejects Bid to FOIA National Security Council, POLITICO (Aug. 7, 2013, 
4:16 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2013/08/judge-rejects-bid-to-foia- 
national-security-council-170147.html. 
23 Miller, supra note 13. 
24 Josh Gerstein, Lawsuit Seeks to Restore FOIA Access to NSC Records, POLITICO 
(Aug. 6, 2013), http://www.politico.com//blogs/under-the-radar/2013/08/lawsuit-seeks-to- 
restore-foia-access-to-nsc-records-169944.html. 




D.C. Circuit’s analysis in Armstrong is outdated because the NSC’s role has 
expanded in recent years to the point that the NSC exercises significant inde- 
pendent authority of the President; Part VI explains why the government’s ar- 
guments are insufficient, and in light of the NSC’s expansive authorities, 
should be rejected. Finally, this Comment concludes that the NSC exercises 
sufficient authority independent of the President to satisfy the requirements of 
the FOIA definition of “agency.” 
	  
I. INFORMATION ACCESS LAWS 
	  
Before examining the ominous legacy of Armstrong, it is essential to distin- 
guish the relevant information access statutes.25 The FOIA, discussed in greater 
detail below, requires document production.26 The Federal Records Act 
(“FRA”)27 is coextensive with the FOIA; documents covered by the FRA are 
subject to direct production under FOIA.28 Before an agency can destroy a fed- 
eral record, it must secure approval from the Archivist.29 On the other side of 
the spectrum, the Presidential Records Act of 1978 (“PRA”)30 gives nearly un- 
restricted discretion to the President over documents created during his term of 
office.31 The PRA also applies to Departments of the Executive Branch, be- 
cause their duties have been held to be indistinct from those of the President.32 
The President is permitted to restrict access to records regarding confidential 
communications between the President and his advisors.33 In a political system 
centered on accountability, it is essential to properly categorize documents; it 
	  
	  
25 Note that prior to the “NSC’s March 25, 1994 declaration that it is not an agency, the 
NSC’s recordkeeping guidelines distinguished between Federal and Presidential Records.” 
Armstrong v. Bush, Exec. Office of the President, 877 F. Supp. 690, 698 (D.D.C. 1995). 
26     5 U.S.C. § 552. 
27     44 U.S.C. § 3106. 
28 Armstrong, 877 F. Supp. at 698. 
29 See 44 U.S.C. § 3303a(a) (2006). The Archivist will disapprove of disposal if the 
record has “sufficient administrative, legal, research, or other value to warrant continued 
preservation.” Id. As the Armstrong court observed, “To dispose of a Federal Record, an 
agency must first garner the approval of the Archivist . . . Consequently, documents that 
qualify as a Federal Record are subject to specific guidelines and procedures in their man- 
agement and disposal.” Armstrong, 877 F. Supp. at 698 (citations omitted). 
30 Presidential Records Act of 1978, 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2207 (2006). 
31 See MINORITY STAFF, COMM. ON GOV’T REFORM, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 
SUMMARY OF THE BUSH EXECUTIVE ORDER ON THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT  1 (2001), 
available     at     http://oversight-archive.waxman.house.gov/documents/20040827100208- 
64911.pdf. 
32 Bailey, supra note 12, at 1479. One writer stated that the “Archivist is required to 
release Presidential Records ‘as rapidly and completely as possible;’ however, the Archivist 
also has the option to dispose of those Presidential Records which she determines ‘have 
insufficient administrative, historical, informational, or evidentiary value.’” Id. 
33     § 2204(a)(5). 




averts needless government secrecy, and allows for a knowledgeable and in- 
formed electorate, which is necessary for a thriving democracy.34 
	  
A. The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
	  
The FOIA provides that any person has a right to obtain access to federal 
agency records.35 The United States Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he 
basic purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the function- 
ing of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the 
governors accountable to the governed.”36 The Court further defined the FOIA 
“as a means for citizens to know what their Government is up to.”37 
“This phrase should not be dismissed as a convenient formalism.”38 That 
phrase “defines a structural necessity in a real democracy.”39 In a 2009  
Presidential Memorandum addressing the FOIA, President Obama stated “a 
democracy requires accountability, and accountability requires 
transparency.”40 The FOIA “encourages accountability through transparency.”41 
The FOIA imposes a presumption in favor of disclosure on federal agen- 
cies, unless a record is specifically exempt from disclosure or the Act’s cov- 
erage.42 Section 552(a)(3) requires agencies to provide the requested records in 
	  
34     ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 
5 (2007). Authors Pallitto and Weaver observed: 
Secrecy imposes tremendous costs on elective government; it is capable of destroying or 
undermining the legal, political, and cultural traditions that undergird our political system. 
The most obvious cost of secrecy is a reduction in executive accountability. To the extent 
that the executive branch becomes impervious to observation, mechanisms designed to keep 
presidents and their administrators honest become useless. Whatever remains secret ulti- 
mately need not be justified to anyone other than the President. 
Id. The people’s right to know is considered vital to the health of our democracy, and open- 
ness benefits us all; therefore, it is essential that government take steps to preserve and keep 
accessible the information that it has. See DAVID BANISAR, GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECI- 
SIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY 1, 9, 31 (2007). 
35 What is FOIA?, FOIA.gov (last visited Feb. 4, 2014) (“[FOIA] . . . is a law that gives 
you the right to access information form the federal government. It is often described as the 
law that keeps citizens in the know about their government.”). FOIA is codified at § 552. 
See generally 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006). 
36 NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978). 
37 Nat’l Archives &   Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
38 Id. at 172. 
39 Id. 
40 Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies Con- 
cerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. (discussing the presumption in favor of disclosure); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) 
(imposing certain limitations on FOIA’s disclosure obligations). Under § 552(b), documents 
need not be disclosed if exempted for one of the following reasons: 
1) classified as relating to national defense or foreign policy; 




the form or format requested if the records are “readily reproducible” in the 
form or format.43 Each agency is required to “make reasonable efforts to search 
for the records in electronic form or format,” unless those efforts would “sig- 
nificantly interfere” with the “automated information system” of the agency.44 
Executive Branch agencies of the federal government, independent regula- 
tory agencies, and some units in the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) 
are under the ambit of the FOIA.45 Subsection (f) of the FOIA defines the term 
“agency” to include any “executive department . . . or other establishment in 
the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the 
President).”46 In the 1974 amendments to the FOIA, Congress indicated in the 
legislative history that in using “Executive Office of the President,” Congress 
intended the term not to mean the President’s immediate personal staff or units 
in the Executive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the Presi- 
dent.47 
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a functional definition of 
“agency” used to decide whether an EOP is subject to the FOIA;48 that is, of- 
fices in the Executive Office of the President that “wield[] substantial authority 
independently of the President” are agencies subject to FOIA.49 To illustrate, 
the Council on Environmental Quality is subject to FOIA, because of its inde- 
	  
2) related only to an internal personnel matter of an agency; 
3) exempted specifically from disclosure by another act of Congress; 
4) trade secrets, commercial, or financial information obtained from a privileged or 
confidential source; 
5) inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda not normally available to the public; 
6) personnel or medical files; 
7) certain information relating to law enforcement; 
8) related to the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or 
9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells. 
Id. 
43     See § 552(a)(3)(B). 
44 § 552(a)(3)(C); see also Presidential Memorandum for Heads of Executive Depart- 
ments and Agencies Concerning the Freedom of Information Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683, 4683 
(Jan. 21, 2009) (“All agencies should use modern technology to inform citizens about what 
is known and done by their Government.”). 
45 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 4 (2013), avail- 
able at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia-guide13/procedural-requirements.pdf#p4. 
46 § 552(f)(1). The 1974 amendments to FOIA expanded the definition of “agency” to 
include those entities that “perform governmental functions and control information of in- 
terest to the public.” H.R. REP. NO. 93–876, at 128 (1974); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 231 
(1974). 
47    H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232. 
48 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 4. 
49 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Office of Admin., 566 F.3d 219, 
222–23 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sweetland v. Walters, 
60 F.3d 852, 854 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“[I]n cases involving units of the Executive Office that 
lacked substantial independent authority, we have consistently rejected the claim that they 
were subject to FOIA.”). 




pendent authority to “issue guidelines to federal agencies for the preparation of 
environmental impact statements,” to “coordinate federal programs related to 
environmental quality,” and to oversee certain activities of other federal agen- 
cies.50 Similarly, the Office of Management and Budget is a FOIA agency, as it 
has a statutory duty to provide budget information to Congress.51 Similarly, the 
Office of Science and Technology is subject to FOIA, despite its close proxim- 
ity to the President, because it has independent authority to evaluate federal 
scientific programs, to initiate and support research, and to award scholar- 
ships.52 In contrast, the Council of Economic Advisers (“CEA”) is not an 
“agency” under FOIA, because the CEA has no regulatory power and its func- 
tion is limited to assisting and advising the President.53 The Office of the Presi- 
dent, including the “President’s immediate personal staff or units in the Execu- 
tive Office whose sole function is to advise and assist the President,” also does 
not constitute an agency under FOIA.54 Additionally, under this substantial 
independent authority analysis, the following agencies were found not to be 
subject to the FOIA: the Executive Residence Staff,55 the National Energy Pol- 
icy Development Group,56 the Office of Counsel to the President,57 and the 




50 Pac. Legal Found. v. Council on Envtl. Quality, 636 F.2d 1259, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 
1980). 
51 Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 901–02 (D.C. Cir. 1978); see also U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 4. 
52 Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1073–76 (D.C. Cir. 1971). In fact, Congress estab- 
lished the Office of Science and Technology Policy in 1976 with a broad mandate, identical 
to that of the NSC, to advise and assist the President. 
53 Rushforth v. Council of Econ. Advisors, 762 F.2d 1038, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 232; see also Kissinger v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom 
of the Press, 445 U.S. 136, 156 (1980); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at 4. 
55 Sweetland v. Walters, 60 F.3d 852, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1995). In Sweetland, the D.C. Cir- 
cuit observed that the Executive Residence Staff’s 
functions demonstrate that it is exclusively dedicated to assisting the President in maintain- 
ing his home and carrying out his various ceremonial duties. The staff does not oversee and 
coordinate federal programs . . . or promulgate binding regulations . . . In short, neither 
Congress nor the President has delegated independent authority to [the Executive Residence 
Staff]. 
Id. 
56 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Dep’t of Energy, 412 F.3d 125, 127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 2005) 
(concluding that the “NEPDG is not itself an ‘agency’ subject to the FOIA because its sole 
function is to advise and assist the President”). 
57 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 45, at.5 & n.31 (citing Nat’l Sec. Archive v. Exec. 
Office of the President, 688 F. Supp. 29, 31 (D.D.C. 1988)). 
58 Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (reasoning that the Presidential 
Task Force on Regulatory Relief was exempt from FOIA, because its members functioned 
as assistants to the President, although the Task Force was chaired by the Vice President and 
composed of cabinet members). 




A recent FOIA development involved the American Civil Liberties Union 
(“ACLU”) and the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”).59 The ACLU filed 
several FOIA requests inquiring into the targeted unmanned drone-killing pro- 
gram.60 After the court held in favor of the CIA, the ACLU appealed to the 
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.61 In a noteworthy victory for transparency, the 
D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court, concluding that, under the circum- 
stances, the CIA’s Glomar response (neither confirm nor deny) was not justi- 
fied.62 On remand to the district court, the CIA would be required to “explain 
what records it is withholding, and on what grounds it is withholding them.”63 
	  
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL 
	  
The NSC was created by The National Security Act of 1947.64 Under the 
chairmanship of the President, with the Secretaries of State and Defense as its 
key members, the NSC coordinates U.S. foreign policy and defense policy, and 
reconciles U.S. diplomatic and military commitments and requirements.65 Be- 
ginning with the end of World War II, “each administration has sought to de- 
velop and perfect a reliable set of executive institutions to manage national 
security policy.”66 The NSC has been at the heart of the “foreign policy coordi- 
	  
	  
59 See generally ACLU v. CIA, 710 F.3d 422 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
60 Id. at 425. 
61 Id. at 426. More specifically, the court held that the CIA “was not required to confirm 
or deny that it had any responsive records, let alone describe any specific documents it 
might have or explain why any such documents were exempt from disclosure.” Id. 
62 Id. at 425. 
63 Press Release, ACLU, DC Appeals Court Rejects CIA’s Secrecy Claims in ACLU’s 
Targeted Killing FOIA Lawsuit (Mar. 15, 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64 National Security Act of 1947 § 101, 50 U.S.C.A 3021 (West 2013). The statutory 
mandate of the NSC is generally “to advise the President with respect to the integration of 
domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security” and to perform 
“such other functions as the President may direct.” National Security Act of 1947 § 101(a)– 
(b), 50 U.S.C.A § 3021 (a)–(b) (West 2013). The NSC consists of “the President and certain 
cabinet-level officials, including the National Security Adviser . . . The NSC staff, which 
numbers about 150 persons, is headed by an Executive Secretary, who reports to the [Na- 
tional Security Adviser], and whom the President appoints without need of Senate confirma- 
tion.” Armstrong, 90 F.3d at 556. 
65 § 3021(a) (There are distinctions between the NSC, the NSC staff, and the NSC sys- 
tem. The National Security Council is the formal, statutory body consisting of the President, 
the Vice President, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. The National 
Security Council Staff consists of the National Security Advisor and the fifty or so area 
and functional specialists who are appointed at the pleasure of the President and who are 
charged with coordinating analysis, offering policy recommendations for the President, 
and providing the staff work for formal council meetings. The NSC system includes both 
the formal council and informal staff.). 
66 Office of the Historian, U.S. Dep’t of State, History of the National Security Council 
1947-1997, WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 1997), https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/NSChistory.htm. 




nation system, but it has changed many times” to best suit the needs of each 
President.67 
The NSC’s operation depends upon the dynamic relationship between the 
President and his advisers and department heads.68 The National Security Act 
envisioned an objective council, discrete from the White House, but overtime a 
new, modern NSC developed.69 The modern NSC system differed from the old 
one in three significant ways.70 First, the national security advisor shifted to- 
wards an influential political presidential advisor instead of the purely adminis- 
trative executive secretary to the President’s council.71 Second, the national 
security advisor’s influence increased the power and reach of the NSC staff.72 
Finally, with the modern, more powerful NSC, the former NSC decreased its 
role.73 
	  
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE NSC AND THE FOIA LITIGA- 
TION THROUGH PRESENT DAY 
	  
The legal controversy over measures for the preservation of NSC records 
has an extensive and complex history.74 In January 1989, the National Security 




68 Id. (President Johnson relied on the National Security Advisor and his staff and vari- 
ous informal groups and trusted friends. President Nixon’s NSC was overwhelmingly influ- 
enced by his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, with whom he maintained a close 
relationship. Kissinger nearly tripled the size of NSC staff, set up inter-departmental work- 
ing groups to prepare NSC directives and became responsible for clearing policy cables. 
Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, NSC staff focused on gaining information from other 
departments, allowing the National Security Advisor to put before the President the best 
possible range of options for decision. Carter believed that the role of the NSC was one of 
policy coordination and that the NSC Adviser would be only one of many players in the 
foreign policy process. The first President Bush incorporated his own foreign policy experi- 
ence to the National Security Council, and restructured the NSC to include a Principals 
Committee, Deputies Committee, and eight Policy Coordinating Committees. The Clinton 
administration fostered a collegial approach within the NSC on national security matters, 
and further expanded NSC membership.). 
69 AMY H. ZEGART, FLAWED BY DESIGN: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIA, JCS, & NSC 76 
(1999). 
70 Id. at 85. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 86. 
73 Id. at 87. 
74 Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the President, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir 1996). 
75 The National Security Archive is a private non-profit organization that pursues dis- 
closure of information relating to defense and national security policy. See About the Na- 
tional Security Archive: 25 Years of Opening Governments at Home and Abroad, NAT’L 
SECURITY ARCHIVE, http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/the_archive.html (last visited Feb. 
11, 2014). 




stored on the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) and NSC electronic 
communications systems from their creation in the mid-1980s to the date of 
request.76 The Archive simultaneously filed suit for an injunction, arguing that 
the electronic documents contained on the EOP and NSC electronic communi- 
cations systems and back-up tapes were federal or presidential records, and 
sought to prevent their destruction.77 The district court held that certain items 
stored in the NSC’s computer system were records subject to the FRA, and that 
the NSC’s guidelines relating to the records’ preservation were “arbitrary and 
capricious.”78 When the government still had no guidelines for the records’ 
preservation, the district court held the government in contempt.79 On appeal, 
the D.C. Circuit Court agreed that the NSC’s guidelines were inadequate, but 
reversed the contempt citation.80 This issue was remanded for the district court 
to determine whether the NSC properly distinguished between presidential and 
federal records.81 
President Clinton’s Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) then rendered an opin- 
ion reversing the position taken in 1978, “declaring the NSC is not an agency 
subject to the FOIA and therefore does not have to comply with the FRA.”82 
President Clinton adopted the OLC’s new position but instructed his then Na- 
tional Security Advisor, Anthony Lake, that the NSC should voluntarily dis- 
close “‘appropriate’ records, including those that had been ‘transferred by one 
Administration to another for transition and continuity purposes.’”83 The Ex- 
ecutive Secretary then asserted that all NSC documents are presidential re- 
cords, exempt from both the FOIA and the FRA.84 
Although the NSC had maintained an active FOIA program during the ad- 
ministrations of Presidents Ford, Carter, Reagan, and Bush,85 the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Armstrong has, since 1996, effectively precluded any citizen from 
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access to NSC generated documents. Current litigation is revisiting the ques- 
tion of whether courts outside the D.C. Circuit should adopt the holding in 
Armstrong or reject it and require the NSC to be subject to the FOIA once 
again.86 The on-going litigation, coupled with convincing evidence that the 
NSC has expanded its role in recent years, strongly corroborates the notion that 
the time has come for courts to restore FOIA access to NSC records, which 
permits greater transparency, accountability, and a stronger democracy. 
	  
IV. THE NSC AND AGENCY STATUS UNDER THE 
FOIA 
	  
In Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, the court held that the 
NSC was not an agency under the FOIA,87 even though the NSC had admitted 
to being an agency and the NSC had processed many FOIA claims as if it were 
subject to FOIA.88 In reaching this conclusion, the court applied the test em- 
ployed in Meyer v. Bush.89  The court believed that because the NSC had a 
“firm structure” and its own staff and budget, the NSC did more than merely 
advise and assist the President.90 The court also found that the NSC had an 
elaborate and self-contained structure.91 Nevertheless, the court noted the NSC 
had close proximity to the President, because the President chaired the NSC 
and the National Security Adviser, who works closely with the President, con- 
trols the NSC staff.92 
As to the third-prong of Meyer, the court noted that because the NSC was 
proximate to the President, there would have to be a “strong showing” that the 
NSC exercised “substantial authority, independent of the President.”93 The 
third-prong in the Meyer analysis looked to the nature of the authority dele- 
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1995), rev’d, 90 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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gated to the NSC.94 The divided court concluded, however, that Armstrong 
failed to carry his burden, as he did not show that the NSC exercises meaning- 
ful non-advisory authority.95 The Armstrong court reasoned that the NSC has 
no authority from Congress.96 The NSC’s authority stemmed from Executive 
Orders.97 Although the Executive Orders have given the NSC authority in di- 
plomacy, non-proliferation, and telecommunications, the Armstrong court be- 
lieved that the NSC did not have a substantive role in those matters that was 
distinct from that of the President.98 Therefore, neither the President nor 
Congress gave the NSC significant independent authority.99 Consequently, the 
FOIA request failed.100 
In deciding whether the Eastern District of New York should adopt Arm- 
strong, as the government argued,101 it is important to understand the NSC’s 
legal responsibilities and how it carries out those responsibilities. This under- 
standing can only come from looking back two decades. Just months after the 
Armstrong decision, for example, Congress established the NSC Committee on 
Foreign Intelligence.102 Not only was this Committee created over the objection 
of the President,103 it also gave the NSC authority that extends beyond advising 
the President, such as reporting directly to an entity outside the NSC and the 
White House.104 
	  
V. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL IN 
LIGHT OF U.S. EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL SECURITY 
	  
In Armstrong, the D.C. Circuit evaluated a NSC that, despite exercising sig- 
nificant independent authority, was still developing. It follows that, for Arm- 
strong to bind courts today, the NSC must continue to solely advise and assist 
the President, as the court found in 1996. A finding that the NSC has expanded 
its role beyond its 1996 capacity certainly calls into question the integrity of 
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emphasis on national security in the twenty-first century and how the NSC has 
responded to this climate. The September 11, 2001 attacks, in many ways, 
marked the beginning of a transformation in U.S. national security policy. 
President George W. Bush declared a national emergency and indicated that 
“we are facing a new and different type of enemy,” an enemy that he described 
as “nameless,” “faceless,” and without “specific borders.”105 In response to the 
9/11 attacks, the government has taken extensive measures to ensure our na- 
tional security by strengthening airline security and securing U.S. borders.106 
This emphasis on national security is evidenced by the enactment of the Home- 
land Security Act,107 the USA PATRIOT Act,108 and the current expansive role 
of the National Security Agency in targeted killings.109 Similarly, the NSC’s 
authority has expanded far beyond purely advising the President.110 Landmark 
cases before the Supreme Court after 9/11 further demonstrate the emphasis on 
national security. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld111 and Rumsfeld v. Padilla,112 the Court 
addressed the President’s power to declare American citizens as “enemy com- 
batants” and detain them indefinitely without trial.113 Then, in Rasul v. Bush114 
and Boumediene v. Bush,115 the Court addressed the government’s power to 
hold non-citizen enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without the 
opportunity to challenge the basis of their detention in any court of the United 
States.116 
Changing the NSC system to meet novel U.S. national security needs has 
been reasonably easy to do.117 The NSC staff routinely handles long-term plan- 
ning as well as the more immediate business of national security.118 The Na- 
tional Security Act allowed major changes to be instituted without new legisla- 
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tion, and executive orders, presidential directives, and other self-executing 
commands have all been used to “create the national security adviser’s posi- 
tion; to alter fundamentally the NSC staff’s role, power, and jurisdiction; and 
to downgrade the operation of the formal National Security Council.”119 In con- 
trast to the pre-Kennedy system, the NSC developed to wield substantial power 
and broad jurisdiction encompassing the full range of near, immediate, and 
long-term affairs.120 Kennedy and his successors have allowed and even en- 
couraged the NSC’s staff-dominance by expanding its jurisdiction and bolster- 
ing its capabilities.121 After Armstrong, 9/11, and two decades of war, the NSC 
has further expanded its jurisdiction, developed its capabilities, and wielded 
substantial and broad authority independent of the President. 
Courts are recognizing that secrecy surrounding U.S. national security pro- 
grams seriously undermines a meaningful and informed public debate on these 
pressing issues, and our ability to evaluate and, when necessary, hold account- 
able the U.S. government.122 The litigation involving the ACLU and CIA high- 
lights that this is the climate we are in: the time for transparency in these pro- 
grams is now and the day has come to overturn Armstrong. 
	  
A. The Significance of Soucie v. David: The Sole Function Test 
	  
As previously mentioned, the 1974 FOIA amendments indicate the congres- 
sional intent behind the phrase “Executive Office of the President (“EOP”).”123 
With regard to the meaning of EOP, Congress endorsed the holding reached in 
Soucie v. David.124 The Soucie court found that if an entity’s “sole function 
[was] to advise and assist the President” that would signal the entity “is part of 
the President’s staff and not a separate agency.”125 In contrast, if an entity 
wields “substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific functions,” 
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test to the NSC, it is clear that the NSC is charged with substantial, broad, non- 
advisory authority, and is therefore an agency for purposes of the FOIA. 
	  
B. The National Security Council Has Significant Authority Beyond Advising 
the President 
	  
The significance of NSC authorities is best understood by its tight-knit im- 
mersion in some of the most troubling assertions of government power. The 
secrecy behind these pressing social issues affects us all. The NSC exercises an 
incredible amount of independent authority in deciding to take the extraordi- 
nary action of using lethal force against U.S. citizens and foreign nationals in 
kill authorizations such as drone strikes.127 In fact, the NSC’s process in which 
U.S. citizens are placed on the “kill list” and executed is conducted entirely 
independently of the President.128 It involves a committee of mid-level NSC 
officials who draw up targeted American citizens for “kill lists.”129 Their target 
recommendations are sent to the panel of NSC “principals,” including Cabinet 
secretaries and intelligence unit chiefs, for approval.130 
The Director of the CIA has also acknowledged the NSC’s control over the 
programs that target American citizens with deadly force without judicial 
process.131 The NSC exercises all this significant authority independent of the 
President.132 For instance, when Anwar al-Awlaki became the first U.S. citizen 
on the “kill list,” President Obama was not required to personally approve the 
targeting of an American; rather, one official said Obama would be notified of 
the principal’s decision.133 A former NSC official explained that “one of the 
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reasons for making senior officials principally responsible for nominating 
Americans for the target list was to ‘protect’ the President.”134 The magnitude 
of NSC power in systematically killing American citizens is the precise inde- 
pendent authority of the President135 that qualifies the NSC as an agency and 
therefore subject to the FOIA. “Even if, as the press has stated, the President 
ultimately approves lists of individuals ‘nominated’ for drone killing, there can 
be no more significant authority than the NSC compiling the list, culling 
names, and deciding who will and who will not be included.”136 
In addition, the NSC approved and is responsible for the extremely aggres- 
sive interrogation methods used after 9/11.137 After the capture of senior Al- 
Qa’ida operative Abu Zubaydah in the spring of 2002, attorneys from the 
CIA’s Office of General Counsel began discussions with the NSC’s Legal Ad- 
visor and OLC concerning the CIA’s proposed interrogation plan for Abu Zu- 
baydah and any legal restrictions on interrogation.138 It was NSC officials who 
approved the interrogation program, which utilized extremely aggressive 
measures.139 With NSC approval, the CIA employed an alternative interroga- 
tion program, including waterboarding on Zubaydah and other detainees be- 
tween 2002 and 2003.140 In the spring of 2003, the same interrogation policies 
and practices were again called into question.141 According to CIA records, 
NSC officials met to discuss the interrogation techniques and reaffirmed that 
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In August 2009, the Special Task Force on Interrogations and Transfer Poli- 
cies, building on suggestions by the Intelligence Science Board,143 proposed the 
establishment of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group to “bring to- 
gether officials from law enforcement, the U.S. Intelligence Community and 
the Department of Defense to conduct interrogations in a manner that will 
strengthen national security consistent with the Rule of Law.”144 Despite fail- 
ures in maintaining lawful techniques in intelligence interrogations, the NSC 
was in charge of policy guidance and oversight of the High-Value Detainee 
Interrogation Group.145 In light of the NSC’s ever-increasing legal authorities 
beyond advising the President, the NSC exercises the independent authority to 
qualify as an agency under the FOIA. 
	  
C. Through Executive Orders, Publicly-Available Directives, and Regulations, 
the NSC Exercises Significant Authority Independent of the President 
	  
The President of the United States has, since the Armstrong decision, issued 
several executive orders and directives that have fundamentally altered the 
NSC staff, authorities, and jurisdiction.146 In fact, through executive orders, the 
President has delegated to the NCS/NSS significant independent authority, 
which in the aggregate, qualifies the NSC as an agency for purposes of the 
FOIA. President Clinton issued an executive order in 1993 that illustrates how 
the NSC is fundamentally altered, changing its power, jurisdiction, and capa- 
bilities. President Clinton, through executive order, delegated to the NSC 
overall policy direction for the newly established National Industrial Security 
Program, designed to safeguard classified information.147 In the Executive Or- 
der, “Structural Reforms To Improve the Security of Classified Networks and 
the Responsible Sharing and Safeguarding of Classified Information,” Presi- 
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dent Obama established a Senior Information Sharing and Safeguarding Steer- 
ing Committee.148 The President delegated overall responsibility for the im- 
plementation of policies and standards for safeguarding classified information 
on computer networks and provided that any “policy or compliance issues” 
that the Steering Committee could not resolve be referred to the Deputies 
Committee of the NSC.149 
In February 2009, the President, through Presidential Policy Directive – 1, 
Organization of the National Security Council System, organized the NSC and 
delegated to the NSC/NSS significant independent authority.150 The President 
ordered the NSC Principals Committee (“NSC/PC”), which the National Secu- 
rity Advisor rather than the President chairs, to continue to be the senior inter- 
agency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.151 
The President ordered the NSC Deputies Committee (“NSC/DC”) to review 
and monitor the work of the NSC interagency process, to ensure that issues 
brought before the NSC/PC or the NSC have been properly analyzed and pre- 
pared for decision.152 The President also delegated responsibility for day-to- 
day crisis management to the NSC/DC.153 In addition, the President delegated 
responsibility to the NSC Interagency Policy Committees (“NSC/IPCs”) to 
achieve development and implementation of national security policies by mul- 
tiple agencies.154 The President also assigns the NSC/IPCs to be the main day- 
to-day responsible entity for interagency coordination of national security pol- 
icy.155 The President further ordered the NSC/IPCs to be established at the di- 
rection of the Deputies Committee and chaired by the NSC.156 At the NSC’s 
discretion, the NSC may add co-chairs to any NSC/IPC if desirable.157 
In a July 2008 Executive Order, entitled “Further Amendments to Executive 
Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” the President updated the 
Strengthened Management of the Intelligence Community and United States 
Intelligence Activities.158 In doing so, the President assigned to the NSC re- 
sponsibility to consider and submit to the President a policy recommendation, 
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including all dissents, on each proposed covert action and conduct a periodic 
review of ongoing covert action activities, including an evaluation of the effec- 
tiveness and consistency with current national policy of such activities and 
their consistency with applicable legal requirements.159 The President further 
ordered the NSC to review proposals for other sensitive intelligence opera- 
tions.160 In an Executive Order entitled “National Defense Resources Prepar- 
edness,” the President delegated the NSC to serve as the integrated policymak- 
ing forum for consideration and formulation of national defense resource pre- 
paredness policy.161 In the Executive Order entitled “Assignment of National 
Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications Functions,” the Presi- 
dent assigned to the NSC policy coordination, guidance, dispute resolution and 
periodic in-progress reviews for security and emergency preparedness commu- 
nications.162 
The NSC and the OST are responsible for the promulgation of telecommu- 
nications regulations concerning national security preparedness activities.163 
The regulations afford to the NSC responsibility to resolve issues involving the 
misuse of federal government activities brought to the attention of communi- 
cation carriers.164 The regulations also provide that the NSC has oversight and 
final decision-making responsibilities for certain government and public tele- 
communications systems.165 The NSC also has responsibility to approve cer- 
tain communication requests during national emergencies.166 All assignments, 
denials and changes of restoration priorities and sub-priorities are subject to 
review and modification by the NSC.167 Based upon the publicly available 
delegations of power to the NCS/NSS, the government’s argument that the 
function of the NSC is purely advisory is unsustainable. 
Publicly available delegations of power clearly indicate the NSC has more 
on its plate than a purely advisory role to the President. Most likely, however, 
there are other non-public functions and authorities relevant to the NSC. This 
gets back to the issue of where the burden of proof should fall in whether an 
entity is an “agency” as that term is defined under the FOIA. It is reasonable, 
in cases where a government entity asserts that it does not constitute an agency 
under FOIA, to require the government entity to prove that its role is purely 
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D. Congress Delegates to the NSC Significant Independent Authority Beyond 
Advising the President 
	  
Congress has expressly authorized the NSC to take on functions that are 
well beyond purely advising the President. Congress has authorized the NSC to 
engage in additional activities,168 including assessing and appraising the objec- 
tives, commitments, and risks of the U.S. in relation to its actual and potential 
military power, in the interest of national security, and to consider policies on 
matters of common interest to the departments and agencies of the government 
concerned with national security.169 Congress has established within the NSC 
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.170 Not only is the President not a 
member of this Committee, 171  but the Committee was created over the express 
objection of the President.172 The Committee is further tasked with conducting 
annual reviews of U.S. national security interests.173 Furthermore, Congress 
established within the NSC the Committee on Transnational Threats, and, like 
the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, the President is not a member.174 This 
Committee is tasked with the wide-ranging mandate to coordinate and direct 
the activities of the United States Government relating to combating transna- 
tional threats.175 The Committee is further tasked with developing strategies 
and policies and procedures to ensure the effective sharing of information 
about transnational threats among federal agencies.176 Additional independent 
authority present within the NSC is the Board for Low Intensity Conflict, 
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tasked with coordinating the policies of the United States for low intensity con- 
flict.177 
The government attempts to label the NSC as a small group of cabinet offi- 
cials purely advising the President. As the immediately preceding paragraph 
shows, this is far from the truth. The NSC’s organization consists of hierar- 
chies of Committees engaged in substantive policy and decision-making, grave 
in nature. Much of this authority, standing alone, may be sufficient to support a 
finding that the NSC exercises independent authority, but the cumulative effect 
of these authorities clearly makes the government’s argument unsustainable. 
In light of the numerous assigned authorities from the President and Congress, 
the NSC is charged with the broad and non-advisory functions and authorities 
to constitute an agency. 
	  
VI. REBUTTING THE GOVERNMENT’S CASE 
	  
An excerpt from the book, A Culture of Secrecy: The Government Versus 
the People’s Right to Know states that, “[t]he best measure of how dearly gov- 
ernment officials protect something from becoming public is how energetically 
they defend it.”178 In fact, from 1989 to early 1997 leading up to Armstrong, 
government lawyers spent over 35,000 hours litigating and appealing decisions 
in the case, costing taxpayers over $4,000,000.179 The government argues that 
subjecting the NSC to the FOIA will unconstitutionally intrude upon both the 
President and the NSC.180 The government argues further that NSC compli- 
ance with FOIA overlaps with the nature of the President’s power as enumer- 
ated under Article II of the Constitution.181 Both these arguments, however, are 
unfounded and contrary to NSC and FOIA precedent.182 In its 1978 opinion, 
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), not only stated that the NSC was an 
agency under FOIA, but addressed the concerns of those who believed that 
FOIA might unconstitutionally intrude upon the President or the NSC:183 
“[D]ue to that nature of the work of the NSC and its staff it is clear that valid 
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exemptions are available for the vast bulk of the material which constitutes 
NSC records.”184 In considering whether the NSC could ever have complete 
immunity from FOIA, the 1978 OLC thought it undoubtedly could not.185 
Moreover, although the government argues that subjecting the NSC to the 
FOIA would violate constitutional separations of power, there is no evidence 
that such intrusions ever occurred during the time the NSC fell within the am- 
bit of the FOIA.186  In addition, applying the FOIA to the NSC would not pre- 
sent a substantial risk of “improper intrusion into the President’s exercise of 
constitutional responsibilities,” since the FOIA already exempts materials clas- 
sified “in the interest of national defense or foreign policy.”187 Further weaken- 
ing the government’s argument, as Judge Tatel’s dissent pointed out, is the fact 
the FOIA has exemptions for national security materials.188 This, coupled with 
the FOIA’s inapplicability to certain information produced by members of the 
NSC who hold distinct non-NSC positions, as in the Office of the President or 
the Vice President, guarantees that NSC compliance with FOIA would not in- 
terfere with the President.189 
In Armstrong, the court found that the NSC is proximate to the President 
simply because the President is a member.190 This argument is conclusory and 
presents several problems. As the dissent pointed out, the President is an ex 
officio member of other EOP groups, which do comply with the FOIA.191 Fur- 
ther undermining this argument is the availability of the “dual-hat” rationale to 
make certain NSC documents available to the public.192 The Supreme Court has 
supported the proposition that an individual serving a department of govern- 
ment may wear more than one hat.193 For example, “when an individual serves 
in two capacities, as an advisor to the President and as a member of an agency, 
that person’s records are not subject to FOIA in the former instance, but are in 
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every person or entity within the EOP would be excluded from the FOIA, con- 
trary to the statute’s expressed inclusion of the EOP in its definition of the term 
“agency.”195 
In Armstrong, the court stressed that units of the EOP with the sole func- 
tions of advising and assisting the President are not agencies.196 Specifically, 
units that do not exercise “substantial independent authority” are not agencies 
under the FOIA.197 The President does, however, delegate additional responsi- 
bilities to Executive Office agencies.198 In this context, the entity performing 
the delegated function is no longer principally advising and assisting the Presi- 
dent.199 Assisting the President in this capacity is quite attenuated from the type 
of aid contemplated by the advise-and-assist exception to FOIA.200 As the dis- 
sent in Armstrong warned, by construing the “advise and assist” language in 
such broad terms, the court was laying the groundwork for exempting all EOP 
units from FOIA merely because the President’s involvement could be traced 
to the units; any delegation the President makes can, if read broadly enough, be 
interpreted to be for the purpose of assisting him.201 This interpretation is ex- 
cessively expansive and would, if applied literally, exempt many agencies cur- 
rently subject to the FOIA.202  Under the current reading, no EOP would be suf- 
ficiently independent to constitute an agency.203 Accordingly, the inquiry into 
agency status should evaluate whether an entity has the power to act provided 
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It is troubling that the Armstrong decision forces individuals to show the 
NSC exercises significant independent authority in order to constitute an 
agency. Traditionally, the burden of proof fell on the plaintiff only to show a 
document held by an agency was a “record” as the term is defined pursuant to 
the FOIA.205 Because the government has sole access to information to prove 
whether an entity is or is not an agency, the burden should be on the govern- 
ment to demonstrate that an entity is not an agency, especially when that entity 
has historically been categorized as such.206 Otherwise, a plaintiff such as 
CUNY can only argue that an entity is an agency by inference or by reference 
to generally known facts about a unit such as the NSC. Given the inequity of 
resources in this contest, it would be extremely difficult for a FOIA litigant to 
successfully prove that a unit of the government is an agency when the entity 
maintains it is not.207 
Finally, the Armstrong court failed to recognize that the stated purpose and 
policy of the FOIA makes it clear that documents possessed by the government 
should, if at all possible, be made available to the public.208 The congressional 
intent behind the passage of the FOIA was to provide clear access for the pub- 
lic to government held information. Congress intended only those documents 
that fell within the ambit of the enumerated exemptions articulated in the FOIA 
be excluded in whole or part from public scrutiny; all other information was to 
be made available.209 In other words, if information in a record falls within an 
exempt category, it should not be released; if it does not fall within the ambit 




As Justice Louis Brandeis claimed, “sunlight is said to be the best of disin- 
fectants.”211 The D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Armstrong was a significant setback 
for transparency, accountability and, therefore, principles at the heart of de- 
mocracy. The Armstrong court, in reaching its opinion, stressed that entities of 
the EOP lacking substantial independent authority should not be categorized as 
agencies as that term is defined in the FOIA.212 Before Armstrong, it was une- 
quivocally accepted that the NSC exercised substantial independent authority 
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that mandated it be subject to the FOIA.213 Although Armstrong has been 
strongly criticized on several grounds, nevertheless it has remained the law of 
the land since 1996. Yet, much has changed in the national security and foreign 
policy arena from 1996 to 2001, and from 2001 to present day. As foreign and 
national security policy has changed significantly, unsurprisingly, the NSC’s 
role has substantially expanded along with it. This vast expansion and trans- 
formation of the NSC renders Armstrong’s analysis outdated and necessitates a 
new evaluation of the issues resolved by the D.C. Circuit eighteen years ago in 
a different time and atmosphere. 
The lawsuit filed last year in district court in Brooklyn, N.Y, was over a 
FOIA request by Main Street Legal Services seeking information on the 
U.S. Government’s use of drone strikes and kill-lists in the war on terror.214 
Main Street Legal Services argued that Armstrong was erroneously decided 
and the day has come for courts to revisit the question of whether the NSC 
should be subject to the FOIA.215 District Court Judge Eric Vitaliano ruled in 
August 2013, rejecting the bid to restore access to National Security Council 
records under the FOIA.216 In light of the expansive and ever-increasing 
authority of the NSC, this reasoning is outdated and erroneous, and 
therefore, cannot be relied on. 
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The lawyers for Main Street Legal Services are pursuing an appeal to the Sec- 
ond Circuit,217 which should recognize the D.C. Circuit’s ruling is outdated. A 
split between the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit will prompt the Supreme 
Court to grant certiorari on the issue, which the justices passed-up on in 1997. 
A conflict on the law in the two circuits on such an important issue—an issue 
that goes to the heart of the level of transparency in our democracy—makes the 
issue of whether NSC records are subject to the FOIA one that will necessitate 
ultimate resolution by the Supreme Court. 
The NSC has dramatically expanded its role since Armstrong, specifically 
through its involvement in the drone targeting process and inhumane interroga- 
tion techniques.218 In addition to reports claiming the NSC’s role has expanded 
in recent years,219 there is clear evidence of significant independent authority 
delegated to the NSC from the President and Congress. This is what the court 
will address in Main Street Legal Services v. National Security Council; based 
on the activities of the NSC today, it would not be surprising for the court to 
reject the Armstrong rational, thus setting up a potential resolution of the mat- 
ter in the Supreme Court. In light of the explosion of intelligence activities and 
the expansion of NSC powers, which have occurred in the last eighteen years 
since Armstrong, complete NSC secrecy and lack of transparency is a critical 
issue to us all. Failure to include NSC records under the ambit of FOIA 
substantially undermines the Act’s purpose of open government and 
transparency, elements essential to a healthy democracy. In this context, it is 
time for a reevaluation of the issues previously decided in Armstrong. It is 
submitted that an examination of the full range of NSC activities in 2014 
unequivocally evidence that the NSC should be characterized as an agency 
as the term is defined in the FOIA and that the NSC should once again be 
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